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Discussant's Response to "The Relative
Importance of Auditing to the Accounting
Profession: Is Auditing a Profit Center?"
Zoe-Vonna Palmrose
University of California at Berkeley
Oh, we still have a few national institutions of trust left . . . Lawrence
Welk, Walter Cronkite, Roy Rogers, penicillin, Mary Tyler Moore,
Price Waterhouse, and hot chicken soup. But everything is under
scrutiny, including our own existence.
1

The Walker and Doll paper discusses forces behind, and consequences of,
increased competition in the audit services market, using the question—"Is
auditing a profit center?" Some might find this question inappropriate, because
it appears to undermine the profession's reason for existence. Others might
find it curious to question the viability of a service over which the profession
has a virtual monopoly. However, I found the question both interesting and
useful, even before recent events made it timely. In my opinion, scrutinizing
the role of auditing in the Big Eight's scheme of services can enhance our
understanding of the market.
My comments focus on two major areas. First, I comment on what appears
missing or only implied in this discussion of competition, specifically some
benefits of competition. Here, recognize that I am biased. I view competition as
generally a good thing. Of course, this view comes easily since I am removed
from the upheavals and uncertainties of life in the trenches. I sympathize with
individuals facing difficulties imposed by competitive forces. And, I am curious
to understand these forces. But I lack empathy towards laments for "the good
old days of auditing"—days of excess demand and fundamental impediments to
competition. My comments on the benefits of competition reflect these biases.
Second, my comments focus on issues raised by Walker and Doll relating to
quality and pricing of audit services. The profession debates whether auditing is
a commodity. Extant empirical research encompasses a similar question—"Are
audit services homogeneous or differentiated?" My comments on quality and
pricing of audit services reference insights from portions of this research.
2

Benefits of Competition
Increased efficiencies represent a major benefit of competition. Walker and
Doll mention improvements in audit efficiencies, primarily through use of
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technology. However, their discussion of efficiencies occurs in the context of
developments strengthening the career attractiveness of accounting and
auditing. The discussion completely ignores any client benefits, including audit
fee reductions, from increased efficiencies in auditing. Although Walker and
Doll bemoan pressures to reduce fees, such pressures entail positive signs. To
some extent, fee pressures reflect current efficiencies and promote future
ones.
Regrettably, Walker and Doll (like others outside Big Eight firms) found
cost and profit data unavailable for assessing the viability of auditing. Instead,
the authors use revenue data. Rather than debate the merits of these data, let
me address several issues not in the paper. First, casual evidence suggests that
partner reductions in some Big Eight firms during 1983-1987 contributed to
growth statistics when using an average revenue per partner measure (Table 4
in Walker and Doll paper). Such partner reductions reflect attempts to enhance
efficiencies in audit practices because of competitive pressures (see PAR, April
1985).
Second, in discussing audit revenue growth, Walker and Doll identify
segments of the market with expanding demand, particularly initial public
offerings (IPO's). I realize that the paper focuses on Big Eight firms.
Nonetheless, from a competitive standpoint, non-Big Eight firms comprise a
significant portion of the IPO market. For example, based on data from
approximately 3,600 IPO's, non-Big Eightfirmshad about 40% of the market
throughout the period 1970-1985 [Palmrose, 1987]. In addition, both the type
of underwriter and the terms of offerings seem to influence the choice of
auditor [Simunic and Stein, 1987].
In addition to increased efficiencies, the availability of information on audit
services and fees represents another benefit from changes in the competitive
environment. Walker and Doll express some regret that audit committees not
only have, but actually use this information. Frankly, I am encouraged that audit
committees exercise their oversight responsibilities.
In summary, increased efficiencies and information, both beneficial to
clients, represent consequences of competition in the audit services market.
However, a fundamental concern regarding any adverse impact on audit quality
as a by-product of increased competition remains. This leads to my second area
of comments.

Quality and Pricing of Audit Services
Empirical research supports the existence of quality-differentiated audit
services in the market as a whole. The evidence suggests not only that quality
differences exist but also that higher quality services translate into higher audit
fees [Francis and Simon, 1987; Palmrose 1986a].
However, evidence becomes problematic when comparing among Big Eight
firms. Studies have found that market participants perceive differences among
the Big Eight [Arnett and Danos, 1979; Shockley and Holt, 1983; Simunic and
Stein, 1987]. Yet, evidence remains weak when using revealed behavior of
market participants via measures including audit fees and auditor litigation. For
example, I tested for pricing differentials among Big Eight firms with industry
specializations and failed to detect any significant audit fee differences between
135
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industry specialists and non-specialists [see Palmrose, 1986a] . Other studies identify one Big Eight firm [Simunic, 1980], or several Big Eight firms
[Balachandran and Simon, 1988], with significantly different audit fees,
although this evidence should be viewed as preliminary. Likewise, examination of litigation activities among Big Eight firms reveals some significant
differences. However, results appear sensitive to the measure of litigation
activities and, therefore, cannot be considered unambiguous [Palmrose,
1988a].
To summarize this area of research, evidence supports quality-differentiation in the audit services market as a whole. However, evidence does not
provide clear indications of differentiation within the Big Eight.
Evidence on price cutting behavior represents a somewhat more fruitful
area of research in terms of insights. Here the literature provides an
economic explanation for low-balling consistent with competition in the
market for audit services [see DeAngelo, 1981]. Furthermore, a recent
study by Simon and Francis [1988, p. 255] contains the followingfindingson
pricing with auditor changes:
• Significant fee reductions occur in the initial year of auditor change
that average 24% of normal fee levels for ongoing engagements.
• In each of the next two years, fee reductions average 15%.
• By the fourth year, fees increase to normal levels for continuing
engagements.
Perhaps the central issue in the Walker and Doll paper involves the effect
of non-audit services on the pricing and quality of audit services. From the
perspective of empirical research, several studies document that audit fees
are higher when clients also purchase non-audit services from their auditor
[Palmrose, 1986b; Simunic, 1984]. Although not the only interpretation for
this result, higher audit fees are inconsistent with auditing as a loss leader for
non-audit services.
Furthermore, in comparing the relative importance of audit and non-audit
services to the Big Eight, Walker and Doll may be understating the vital role
of audit clients in generating non-audit service revenues. In a study of over
350 public and closely-held companies, nearly 80% of the companies
purchased some non-audit services (tax or management consulting services)
from their incumbent auditors, while only three percent of the companies
purchased non-audit services exclusively from other public accounting firms
[Palmrose, 1988b]. It appears that much of the Big Eight's non-audit service
revenue is derived from services to audit clients.
However, this begs the question of whether market participants perceive
auditor independence (quality) problems in conjunction with the growing
importance of non-audit services to the Big Eight. Certainly, the perception
of auditors marching to a beat of sell-sell-sell non-audit services while
conducting audit engagements is troublesome.
4
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Actually, this test involves intra-firm quality-differentiated audit services.
My comments illustrate the economic benefits of joint supply of audit and non-audit services.
These benefits include auditor reputation or brand name effects. In discussions at the
Symposium, W. R. Kinney, Jr., emphasized the latter.
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Concluding Remarks
There remains one, albeit minor, point made by Walker and Doll that
requires some attention. It is the following:
In our view, academicians need to do a better job of attracting quality
students to their A&A programs. The strong emphasis on research at
some universities seems to have reduced the emphasis on teaching. We
believe it is important that experienced instructors who are dynamic in
the classroom teach at least some sections of "Principles of Accounting" as well as upper division electives.
First, room for debate exists as to whether attracting students to
accounting and auditing (A&A) careers represents a legitimate role for
educators. I think not. Next, it is a myth that good researchers are in general
not good teachers. Frequently, good research and good teaching occur
together. Furthermore, the profession is mistaken in assuming that because
good teaching will not guarantee tenure at "research institutions," these
institutions do not emphasize good teaching. Nonetheless, these comments
demonstrate that academicians can improve communication with the profession
regarding the value ascribed to undergraduate education.
Improved communication between academics and the profession on teaching likewise extends to research. As my comments on Walker and Doll's paper
scrutinizing the role of auditing in the Big Eight's scheme of services indicate,
we are trying to understand the same issues. In conclusion, let me emphasize
how much I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this Symposium to
discuss some of these issues.
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